Infocom

Four Years Since the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War: A Data-Driven Reflection on Escalations Between Armenia and Azerbaijan

It has been four years since the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War erupted, yet the region continues to witness significant escalations along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. As with any modern armed conflict, the confrontation unfolds not only "on the ground" but also in the information space. At times, information warfare becomes even more critical, and can significantly impact the capacities of both sides. The events of 2020 and later escalations have left numerous traces in the information space, including news reports and official statements from both Armenia and Azerbaijan. While official statements are often biased — crafted to shape public opinion and support information warfare or disinformation campaigns — they remain valuable for analyzing long-term trends and the rhetorical strategies of the involved parties. Over time, we can now reflect more deeply on the war, subsequent escalations, and the role of information warfare, not only through personal narratives but through a data-driven approach as well. Daily Reports on Escalations from the Armenian and Azerbaijani Defense Ministries, Smoothed with a 10-Day Average Access this daily updated tool here to stay informed on escalations along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. If one selects all the news related to armed conflicts, border escalations, and reports of provocations from the official websites of the Armenian and Azerbaijani Ministries of Defense, a general trend of escalation and de-escalation can be observed, as depicted in Graph 1 (details on the data collection process can be found in the section "How We Counted" below). The horizontal dashed line represents the average number of reports issued by the Azerbaijani MoD from 2018 to the present used as a reference point since it was the Azerbaijani side that initiated several major escalations. The analysis of the graph reveals that Azerbaijan significantly outpaces Armenia in terms of information delivery, especially during pivotal events. Most peaks in news coverage related to escalations, such as the 2020 war and the 2023 military operation in Nagorno Karabakh, are dominated by Azerbaijan in the number of reports. Armenia only surpassed Azerbaijan in a few notable instances: during border escalations in May 2021, clashes in September 2022, and near Sotk in May 2023. Furthermore, Azerbaijan’s major escalations are often preceded by a smaller-scale military actions or information campaigns. These may aim to shape public opinion, justify military actions, mask troops' movements, or divert attention from the planned direction of attack. This pattern corroborates previous academic findings and media reports, including those from Armenia. Azerbaijan’s offensive during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, for instance, was preceded by an information campaign accusing Armenia of provocations, while the military operation in Karabakh in September 2023 was prefaced by both an information campaign and actual military actions. Analyzing the rhetoric of the defense ministries is also pertinent, as it reflects the official narratives used by both sides. This analysis is divided into two stages: the first from 2018 to 2020, highlighting events preceding and following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and the second from 2021 onward, reflecting changes in conflict dynamics and rhetoric due to the altered status quo. Figure 2 presents word clouds that illustrate the predominant themes in the rhetoric of the MoDs of both countries between 2018 and 2020. Word Clouds Depicting Key Rhetoric of Armenia (left) and Azerbaijan (right), 2018-2020 The Armenian MOD’s word cloud through 2020 predominantly reflects topics related to the 2020 war. It highlights three main themes: the actions and destruction of Azerbaijani military forces, the defense of Nagorno Karabakh, and efforts to reassure the public that the situation remains stable, albeit tense. The theme of UAVs, which became a crucial tool for Azerbaijan’s military advantage, also features prominently. In stark contrast, the Azerbaijani MoD’s word cloud for the same period reveals a focus on offensive actions. Reports are dominated by updates on the destruction of Artsakh Defense Army units, precision strikes, and the use of aviation and drones. Additionally, Azerbaijan frequently reported artillery shelling by Armenian forces on its territory, using these incidents to justify its retaliatory measures. A comparison of these word clouds reveals a significant finding: the Azerbaijani word cloud is notably denser than the Armenian one, reinforcing Azerbaijan’s dominance in the information space. The Armenian Ministry of Defense produced fewer, shorter, and more general statements, while Azerbaijan issued more frequent and detailed reports. Since the analyzed news comes from the English-language sections of the MoDs’ websites, we could expect these reports to be primarily targeted at an external audience. Thus, Azerbaijan’s rhetoric appears to be more finely tuned for international audiences, whereas the Armenian messages seem more like direct translations of domestic communications, with less adaptation for an external context. Word Clouds Depicting Key Rhetoric of Armenia (left) and Azerbaijan (right), 2021-2024 The rhetoric of both defense ministries has shown notable similarities after the 2020 war. Both sides frequently emphasized armed clashes and small arms usage during escalations as illustrated in the 2021-2024 word clouds. The Armenian MOD often aims to refute Azerbaijan’s claims naming them as inaccurate, while Azerbaijan consistently frames its actions as responses to provocations from Armenia. Interestingly, Armenian MoD reports have highlighted a specific location of incidents involving the shelling of a metallurgical plant in Yeraskh by Azerbaijani forces in the summer of 2023. This under-construction plant, financed by foreign investments, has become a focal point in Armenian rhetoric. Armenia’s emphasis on this incident appears to be a strategic move to attract international attention and garner diplomatic support by underscoring the violation of foreign investor interests due to Azerbaijani military actions. This shift may indicate an evolution in Armenia’s rhetorical strategy, aiming to engage external actors more effectively — something that was challenging to achieve in 2020. Analyzing reports on escalations not only provides insights into general trends and helps unpacking each side’s rhetoric but also explores the relationship between different types of events. For instance, it is particularly interesting to compare the dynamics of Azerbaijani MoD reports on escalations with those on military exercises. This comparison is especially relevant given that military exercises are often used to prepare troops for specific operations and covertly concentrate necessary resources. There are several considerations to keep in mind. First, each military exercise is usually accompanied by several news reports on individual events, so one event may create a dense information flow increasing the number of reports and frequency of mentions. Second, it is plausible that the more significant and diverse the exercise, the more news it generates. Third, when real combat begins, reports on exercises typically diminish or disappear entirely, as frontline events take priority, even if the exercises continue parallel with military operations. Despite these caveats, we can reasonably assume that a decrease in reports on exercises likely indicates their absence, potentially due to preparations for or the onset of military actions. We can also argue for the reverse logic: the intensification of exercises may indicate both an increased focus on troop training and preparations for military actions. Recent wars and military operations offer numerous examples where exercises masked troop preparations and positioning for conflict. One only needs to recall Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008 or the start of the Ukraine war in February 2022. With this context, we compared the dynamics of Azerbaijan’s MoD reports on escalations with reports of military exercises by the Azerbaijani army and joint Azerbaijan-Turkey exercises on Azerbaijani soil. The findings are illustrated in the graphic below. Daily Comparison of Reports on Escalations vs. Military Exercises, Smoothed with a 10-Day Average The graph clearly shows that, according to Azerbaijan’s own defense ministry, each major escalation was preceded by a period of intensive military exercises. Before the 2020 war, Azerbaijan was actively conducting training with its units. To be fair, Armenia’s defense ministry reports were also filled with news of exercises that summer, reflecting summer-fall as a logical period for extensive troop training. However, when we contextualize this with the fact that every major military action by Azerbaijan was preceded by joint Azerbaijan-Turkey exercises on Azerbaijani territory, the connection between military drills and subsequent escalations becomes difficult to ignore. This is further evidenced by the presence of Turkish military units, particularly F-16 fighter jets and Bayraktar drones, in Azerbaijan during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Summary: The data-driven analysis of escalations between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War reveals that: Azerbaijan consistently dominated the information space, issuing more detailed reports on escalations and military actions fine-tuned for external audiences, compared to Armenia. Major escalations are often preceded by smaller-scale incidents or information campaigns, as seen in Azerbaijan’s systematic narrative of Armenian provocations before both the 2020 war and the 2023 military operation in Nagorno Karabakh, which served to legitimize its actions. Post-2020, both parties have evolved their rhetoric: Azerbaijan has shifted from emphasizing offensive military actions to framing its military moves as defensive responses to Armenian provocations. Armenia has transitioned from focusing on the defense of Nagorno Karabakh to refuting Azerbaijani claims and highlighting incidents with international implications, increasing reliance on international diplomacy to counter Azerbaijan’s dominance. The military exercises, particularly joint Azerbaijan-Turkey exercises, often coincide with the build-up to major military actions. The presence of Turkish F-16s and Bayraktar drones during the 2020 war suggests that Azerbaijan leverages these exercises not only for training but also as preparation for military engagements, using military exercises as a tool for both tactical preparation and signaling. In conclusion, this analysis of open-source data demonstrates the complex interplay between military actions, information warfare, and diplomatic maneuvering in the ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. While Azerbaijan’s dominance in both military and information arenas is clear, Armenia’s shifting strategies toward internationalizing the conflict, particularly by emphasizing incidents that affect foreign interests, highlight the multifaceted nature of modern conflict management. As the conflict continues to evolve, these trends underscore the importance of both military capability and the ability to shape the narrative in securing strategic advantage. The dynamics of escalation will likely remain intertwined with both military maneuvers and information warfare, with both sides continuing to vie for control over public perception and diplomatic support. ___________________________________________________________________________________________ How We Calculated This analysis relies on open-source data, meaning the information is not exhaustive and may be biased. For example, a single event — such as a military exercise — can be covered in a series of reports, each highlighting a different aspect adding to the frequency of mention. The shelling by the opposing side may be emphasized, while violations of the rules and laws of war by one’s own forces may be minimized. Nevertheless, despite these limitations, open-source data enables us to discern broader trends and gain insight into how rhetoric and information warfare are conducted. Dynamics of Escalations The data for analyzing the dynamics of escalations was collected from the official websites of the Ministries of Defense of Armenia and Azerbaijan. For consistency, the English version of the news section was used to scrape the relevant news pieces. To ensure accuracy, the news items were filtered using language models, selecting only reports related to escalations such as firefights, military equipment buildups, provocations, UAV incursions, combat operations, shelling, strikes, and destruction of equipment or just the reports aimed to refute the information/disinformation about the specified events distributed by an opponent. Further filtering was applied to retain only the news reports directly mentioning Azerbaijan as an opponent or the Artsakh Defense Forces as an ally of Armenia and Armenia and Artsakh Defense Forces as the opponents of Azerbaijan. The selected news pieces were then aggregated by day, allowing a clearer visualization of the trends in escalations over time. The general trend illustrates the number of reports concerning escalations daily, starting from January 1, 2018. The x-axis represents the months and years, while y-axis values and points on the graph reflect the number of reports from the MoDs of both countries. The lines on the graph represent trends smoothed with a 10-day average, allowing for better visualization of the messaging dynamics, rather than raw data. Word Clouds Word clouds were generated based on the filtered news reports from both MoDs, which were used to analyze the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation. The full text of the news pieces was used. The news pieces were initially categorized by topics utilizing a language model. In the next step, each topic's 10 most frequent words were selected to build the word clouds. Stopwords, settlement names, and regional references were excluded to focus on the rhetoric surrounding the actions of each side, rather than the locations involved. Military Exercises and Escalations Data on military exercises conducted by the Azerbaijani army was gathered from the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense’s news reports and manually filtered. Only reports on exercises conducted by the Azerbaijani army on Azerbaijani soil without the participation of foreign countries were included. For joint Azerbaijani-Turkish exercises, only reports on training events involving both countries on Azerbaijani territory were considered. Each news item was counted as one exercise, though a single military exercise usually generated multiple reports. Notably, ceremonial events, conferences, and receptions related to the exercises were excluded from the analysis, focusing solely on reports concerning combat training or inspections of military units. The lines on the graph represent smoothed trends, allowing for better visualization of the messaging dynamics rather than raw data. Iurii AgafonovResearch Fellow, Yerevan Center for International Education (YCIE), Scrapalyze Lab Main photo by Kate Mamyan

21:40 - 30 September, 2024

Animal trade: the uncertain destiny of animals imported into Armenia and the tacit consent of the state

Between 2017 and 2022, nearly 4,000 wild animals were imported into Armenia from various parts of the world. The destiny of the majority of these animals remains obscure due to insufficient statistical records and incomplete customs data. The Ministry of the Environment of the Republic of Armenia (MoE), the Food Safety Inspection Body (FSIB), and in some cases, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Environmental Protection and Mining Inspection Body, are the authorities that issue permits and conclusions for the trade of wild animals, but they do not have access to comprehensive information about imported and exported animals. The customs service of the State Revenue Committee (SRC) similarly lacks comprehensive information regarding the importation and exportation of animals. This deficiency is attributed to what they describe as "objective and subjective" factors, including incomplete documentation in customs records. From the Republic of South Africa (RSA) to private companies in Russia via Armenia In 2021, 45 giraffes were imported into Armenia. During the transfer, one of them perished, and another one died shortly after arriving in Armenia. The fate of the remaining giraffes is currently unknown. Several months following their importation into Armenia, agreements were reached to sell 30 of the giraffes. Re-export permits were issued for 12 of them to "Ovatsiya" LLC, based in the city of Tula, Russia. This company is involved in the retail trade of food, including meat and meat products. Another 12 giraffes were intended to be sent to “Yaltinsky Zoo SKAZKA” LLC. Additionally, permission to export the remaining 6 giraffes was granted to an individual undertaker Eduard Sergeyevich Khachaturyan. Khachaturyan's name has previously been cited in the media in connection with suspicious transactions involving the transportation of wild animals from Armenia to the Russian Federation. However, none of these transactions were completed due to a ban imposed by Rosselkhoznadzor of the Russian Federation in 2020. The ban prohibits the entry of animals from RSA, as well as animals sensitive to aphthous fever, into Russia.Giraffes were imported to Armenia by "Fauna Zoo" LLC, whose owners previously conducted animal trade transactions through "Zoo Fauna Art" LLC, which went bankrupt in 2017 and is currently undergoing liquidation. The bankruptcy manager, Samson Ghukasyan, informed "Infocom" that the area where this company is registered is mortgaged and will soon be sold. However, the sale is being delayed due to an issue concerning the status of the land. At least four government agencies in Armenia have facilitated this import transaction by issuing permits and providing favorable professional opinions. These agencies include the Ministry of Environment of the Republic of Armenia (MoE), the Food Safety Inspection Body (FSIB), the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and the Environmental Protection and Mining Inspection Body. However, none of these entities offer complete information regarding the current status of the animals. How is the Scientific Center of Zoology and Hydroecology of the NAS of RA involved in the importation of giraffes? Observations by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) indicate a significant decline in giraffe populations over recent decades. Studies from 1985 to 2015 reveal a decrease of 36-40% in giraffe numbers, attributed to increased human exploitation (anthropogenic factors) and habitat loss. Since 2016, giraffes have been included on the IUCN Red List with a "Vulnerable" (VU) status. The IUCN estimates there are approximately 68,293 mature individuals of giraffes. Since 2019, giraffes have been classified under Appendix II of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). This placement further emphasizes the necessity to prioritize conservation efforts and protect these animals. The Scientific Center of Zoology and Hydroecology of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia submitted a written conclusion to the Ministry of Environment, stating that giraffes cannot survive in Armenia's natural environment. At the same time, the conclusion affirms that the facilities of "Fauna Zoo" LLC adhere to all international norms and standards of animal care, enabling the temporary housing of the animals on the premises. Thus, the scientific center did not oppose the importation of 45 giraffes without any scientific justification. In the official documents, the purpose of importing giraffes was stated to be for animal trade and breeding. In other words, the main purpose of importing the animals is further resale. In the professional conclusion of the Scientific Center of the National Academy of Sciences, environmental damage resulting from the importation, the impact of climate change on the animals, and the effects of keeping them in captivity were not considered. Observations by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) indicate a significant decline in giraffe populations over recent decades. Studies from 1985 to 2015 reveal a decrease of 36-40% in giraffe numbers, attributed to increased human exploitation (anthropogenic factors) and habitat loss. Since 2016, giraffes have been included on the IUCN Red List with a "Vulnerable" (VU) status. The IUCN estimates there are approximately 68,293 mature individuals of giraffes. Since 2019, giraffes have been classified under Appendix II of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). This placement further emphasizes the necessity to prioritize conservation efforts and protect these animals. The Scientific Center of Zoology and Hydroecology of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia submitted a written conclusion to the Ministry of Environment, stating that giraffes cannot survive in Armenia's natural environment. At the same time, the conclusion affirms that the facilities of "Fauna Zoo" LLC adhere to all international norms and standards of animal care, enabling the temporary housing of the animals on the premises. Thus, the scientific center did not oppose the importation of 45 giraffes without any scientific justification. In the official documents, the purpose of importing giraffes was stated to be for animal trade and breeding. In other words, the main purpose of importing the animals is further resale. In the professional conclusion of the Scientific Center of the National Academy of Sciences, environmental damage resulting from the importation, the impact of climate change on the animals, and the effects of keeping them in captivity were not considered. Giraffes and other wildlife, unseen and unheard In 2021, efforts were made to determine the whereabouts and living conditions of the 43 giraffes imported into Armenia. Despite repeated attempts to contact the “Fauna Zoo” company, our inquiries were unsuccessful as they refused to respond to our questions.The "Fauna Zoo" is registered at 148 G. Mahari Street (Erebuni administrative district). This address is stated in all documents as the location of animal importation. Assuming that the giraffes brought from RSA are housed at this address, we submitted a written request to the FSIB in 2022 regarding the animals kept in the area.The FSIB didn't provide specific numbers for the giraffes, but they did mention giraffes, zebras, goats, tigers, lions, monkeys, parrots, and rhinos being housed at the address. That's the latest update we have on the giraffes at 148 G. Mahari Street. However, when we pressed for further information, both the FSBI and EPMIB stonewalled us, saying they needed written consent from the company. Our visit to the premises of "Fauna Zoo" LLC yielded no new information. G. Mahari Street is a residential area, a typical street in Yerevan. Surprisingly, even the residents of the neighborhood are unaware of the presence of wild animals living nearby. They have neither seen, heard, nor sensed the presence of such a large number of animals in their vicinity. This is despite the fact that, according to data from the SRC, MoE, and FSIB, there are supposedly 43 giraffes, 20 zebras, 49 ibex, 20 crocodiles, 20 caracals, 20 servals, 20 genets, lions, and tigers kept in this area. Unveiling the official data According to the data provided by the SRC, 3,941 wild and exotic animals with different conservation statuses were imported to Armenia from different countries in 2017-2022. Due to the lack of complete records, the fate, status, location and conditions of most of these animals are unknown. Quantity and customs value of wild animals imported to and exported from Armenia, 2017-2023 Only 703 of the imported animals, mostly small birds, were exported. Put differently, official data indicates there should be 3,238 imported animals in Armenia. However, no state institution, including the MoE, responsible for issuing animal import permits, provides complete information about the location and status of these animals. Dashboard 1 (3)

Some of the imported animals, sought for entertainment purposes, can be found in various private spaces. For instance, they are housed in the residence of former NA deputy Gagik Tsarukyan, or in the "Hrashk Aygi" restaurant. According to the state register, the restaurant's owner is the son of former Prime Minister Hovik Abrahamyan's driver. Monkeys, for instance, have become readily available for purchase in Armenia. Furthermore, influencers also play a role in the sale of animals. “The convention is aimed at protecting wildlife, not promoting their trade” The main import partner countries to Armenia are the RSA (18 animal species) and Benin (16 animal species). These African countries are known for their rich wildlife, but also for poachers and animal traffickers. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) categorizes animal species into three appendices based on their level of threat: Appendices I, II, and III. In Appendix I are endangered animal species, and the transportation of these specimens is permitted only under exceptional circumstances. The CITES permit is issued by both the exporting and importing countries. Species listed in Appendix II are endangered and require constant monitoring. The CITES permit is issued solely by the exporting country. Animal species listed in Appendix III are less endangered, but their transport is still regulated and documented, with no permit required. Between 2017 and 2022, Armenia imported 9 endangered (Appendix I) and 32 threatened (Appendix II) animal species. The remaining animal species either fall under Appendix III or have not yet been listed in the Convention. The purpose of the Convention is frequently misunderstood and misinterpreted, particularly in Armenia and the African countries, which are common sources of imported animals. Maria Vorontsova, a candidate of biological sciences and international expert, and a regular participant in UN Conferences of Parties, explains: "This convention was established when it became evident that animals were being extracted from nature and transported globally. CITES serves as the document that regulates and aims to mitigate this process. CITES primarily deals with cross-border transportation. Many people mistakenly view it as a trade convention, but that's not the case. Its main focus is on regulating the movement of wildlife across borders, with the aim of protecting wildlife rather than promoting trade. CITES countries are required to have domestic legislation that either matches or exceeds the standards set by the Convention. For instance, Australia, home to numerous parrot species, has implemented a complete ban on their export as a means to reinforce CITES regulations. The convention doesn't mandate such action, but Australia takes pride in its fauna and sees no reason to remove parrots from the country. Experience has shown that exporting them typically leads to unfavorable outcomes—they often perish." According to another expert, Iman Memarian, a veterinarian consultant with European Association of Zoos and Aquaria (EAZA), there is also a significant risk of corruption in animal trade. "Unfortunately, the Convention doesn't assess the conditions of captivity or the country's overall capacity to care for the animals. Corruption is prevalent, even prior to licensing." Animals resold at prices substantially lower than their original purchase cost Instances where animals can be traced through customs data often reveal suspicious business transactions. For example, in 2020, four African marabou were imported from Benin, with a total customs value of 647,400 AMD, equating to 168,600 AMD per bird. The following year, ten more marabou were imported, valued at 1,082,000 AMD in customs value, making the cost of each bird 108,260 AMD. Seven of these birds were exported to Ukraine at a significantly lower customs value, priced at 35,800 drams each, totaling 250,840 drams. In other words, the selling price is several times lower than the import price. Such a significant price gap suggests less of a profitable business venture and more of a charitable endeavor or financial loss. This transaction likely involved "Yerznkyan Zoo Center" LLC, as export permits indicate that this company obtained re-export authorization for 7 African marabou birds from the Ministry of Environment in 2021. This circumstance should have prompted the SRC to thoroughly and efficiently investigate the import and export data for the same item. Such a significant price difference between imports and exports may suggest a risk of tax evasion. Who bears ultimate responsibility? The issue of wild animal trade and Armenia's involvement in it could be a subject of continuous study and discussion, given numerous incidents like the disappearance of the 43 giraffes. Yet, the most pressing question remains unanswered: where are these animals now, and in what condition do they find themselves? It appears that both local and international legal regulations have tasked state bodies with providing answers to this question. However, the available facts do not shed light on the matter. The CITES establishes universal regulations and standards governing the global transportation of wild animals, leading to the establishment of permit-granting systems within individual countries. Oversight of this system falls to the respective state authorities. In Armenia, the Ministry of Environment serves as the coordinating body, while scientific guidance is provided by the National Academy of Sciences. The Ministry's issuance of numerous permits for the import and export of protected wild animals is evidently a concerning factor with potential environmental repercussions. Many cases of animals being exploited for entertainment or private trade have been documented in Armenia, highlighting the apparent indifference of the Ministry of Environment and other relevant authorities. For instance, the FSIB and Environmental Protection and Mining Inspection Body decline to disclose information regarding the quantity and welfare of animals housed within the premises of "Fauna Zoo" LLC. The National Academy of Sciences, which provided a favorable professional opinion for the importation of large quantities of wild animals without scientific justification, and the Customs Service of the State Revenue Committee, which permits the transportation of animals across borders without sufficient supervision. In essence, the CITES Convention primarily concerns the cross-border movement of wild animals, suggesting that permits should only be granted in cases of dire necessity, rather than for commercial or business motives. It’s remarkable that Armenia's governmental institutions deviate from the core tenets of the Convention; instead, they permit and even facilitate numerous transfers of wild animals, leveraging their authority to issue CITES permits. It appears that the convention grants each country the autonomy to establish and adhere to its own regulatory framework. Undoubtedly, there is a significant population of animals already held in captivity under substandard conditions within the country. However, this inadequately regulated trade continues to fuel their numbers. Author: Mariam Tashchyan Infographics: Bibinur Bolotkanova Mentor: Kate Mamyan

20:11 - 28 February, 2024